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1 Introduction
This article focuses on economic policies and judges
their success based on their impact on growth and
poverty reduction. The Millennium Development
Goal of halving extreme income poverty by 2015
expresses the consensus of the international
development community that poverty reduction is of
overriding importance. There is also consensus that
national poverty reduction strategies, and Poverty
Reduction Strategy Papers in particular, are the
primary vehicle for focusing national policies on
reducing poverty.
Beneath this apparent consensus, there are,
however, significant differences. This article ‘swims
against the tide’, so to speak, in arguing that such
differences are healthy and should be encouraged,
and, moreover, that achieving international
consensus is not a desirable goal. In this respect, this
article ‘steals’ at least one idea from neoliberal
thinking, namely, that a ‘marketplace of ideas’, in
which there is competition among conflicting views,
should be promoted.
Ironically, there is not a great deal of space for such a
stance in the current climate. Despite their poor
performance in the last quarter century, neoliberal
policies – which include deregulation, privatisation,
macroeconomic interventions that focus exclusively
on price stability, and, in general, development
strategies that subscribe to the belief that free
markets maximise wellbeing – continue to occupy a
hegemonic position in economic policymaking and
the development discourse.1
Compared with the performance of post-colonial
policymaking in developing countries, roughly from
the 1950s through to the mid-1970s, neoliberal
conditionality-based policies have performed poorly,
in terms of (1) slow economic growth, (2) greater
economic instability, (3) rising inequality, (4) widening
underemployment and (5) persistently pervasive
poverty. If one questions, for example, the statistical
anomaly of a dramatic reduction in poverty in China
from 1993 to 1996 (a very short period of time), one
is hard pressed to argue that the proportion of the
population in extreme income poverty in the world
declined in the 1990s.
Of course, neoliberal policies are not without their
critics. Within mainstream economics, there has
been a recent stream of prominent critics – such as
Joseph Stiglitz, Jeffrey Sachs, Nancy Birdsall, Ravi
Kanbur and William Easterley – who have broken
with particular neoliberal approaches in one form or
another. In practice, however, the bulk of external
recommendations on economic policymaking being
supplied to developing countries remain neoliberal.
More importantly, these recommendations are tied
to binding conditionalities. Even if national
policymakers disagree with the recommendations,
they are bound to implement them if they wish their
country to receive debt relief or continue receiving
concessional lending, or even grant-based technical
assistance.
More ominous has been the encroachment of
conditionalities across a wide gamut of national
policymaking, including social policies and
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governance as well as economic policies. In the early
days of structural adjustment, the lives of national
policymakers were simpler: economic policies were
imposed on them by international financial
institutions but they had, at least, some degrees of
freedom in how they picked up the pieces thereafter.
At first, conditionalities just applied to
macroeconomic policies, but soon they were applied
to broader structural issues, i.e. structural adjustment.
In short order, national policymakers found that they
had no real ‘ownership’ of their own economic
strategies and their overall development strategies
were soon forced to tail after their economic
strategies, or relegate themselves to irrelevance.
As was well documented in the late 1980s and early
1990s (cf. UNICEF’s Structural Adjustment with a
Human Face and UNDP’s Human Development
Reports), structural adjustment imposed heavy social
costs in the countries on which it was imposed. In
order to foster greater ‘national ownership’,
international financial institutions extended their
assistance to constructing social safety nets in order
to help mitigate the consequences of adjustment. But
since the adverse impact of adjustment continued to
be pervasive through the early 1990s, constructing
nets was no longer regarded as adequate. By the
mid-1990s, these social safety nets were well on their
way to being upgraded to national poverty reduction
strategies (cf. The 1995 World Summit for Social
Development). By 1999, the World Bank and IMF
agreed to tie their assistance, and their
conditionalities, to the national adoption and
‘ownership’ of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers.
Several serious problems remain, despite the shift
from structural adjustment to PRSPs. One is the
glaring inconsistency between economic policy
conditionalities, which continue to be based on
neoliberalism, and the social focus of Poverty
Reduction Strategy Papers. Reconciling these two
approaches has proven to be difficult. Social policies
remain ill equipped to undo the detrimental effects of
neoliberal economic policies, e.g. economic stagnation,
growing underemployment, increasing vulnerability,
intensifying insecurity and widespread poverty.
Even when growth occurs in some developing
countries, it is often not reaching the poor. This has
raised the importance in the international
development community of identifying policies that
can foster ‘pro-poor growth’. This is growth that not
only can improve the ‘absolute’ conditions of poor
households (by raising their level of real incomes) but
also can enhance their ‘relative’ conditions vis-à-vis
non-poor households (by reducing inequality
between the poor and non-poor). This is difficult
enough to accomplish under normal capitalist
patterns of development but doubly difficult when
the governing economic strategy is neoliberal.
In most cases, growth has been too slow and too
pro-rich. One might expect the more enlightened
rich to remain unsatisfied with such an ambivalent
outcome – namely, a larger share of a more slowly
expanding pie. There are bound to be diminishing
marginal returns to self-aggrandisement under such
a scenario. This is, no doubt, one of the factors
fuelling the emerging differences within mainstream
economics.
In consideration of some of the factors outlined
above, UNDP has in recent years begun to critically
examine the impact of orthodox economic policies
on growth, human development and poverty
reduction. It has been motivated by three major
concerns: (1) trying to determine, practically, how
‘pro-poor growth’ can be achieved; (2) trying to
reconcile the seeming inconsistencies between
neoliberal economic policies and Poverty Reduction
Strategy Papers (PRSPs); and (3) trying to promote a
broader and healthier policy dialogue on these issues
by helping create a larger menu of viable economic
options and alternatives.
‘Pro-poor growth’ is an unlikely outcome unless
economic policies and PRSPs are mutually consistent
and this consistency is unlikely, in turn, as long as
economic policymaking is wedded to economic
orthodoxy. In addition, insofar as neoliberalism
remains dominant, there is little room for meaningful
dialogue and debate on economic policies.
These are the initial lessons from UNDP’s support to
an array of national studies on Economic Policies and
Poverty Reduction in the Asia region (see, for
instance, McKinley 2003, 2004; Pasha 2003).
In the following sections, the article concentrates on
seven interrelated issues: (1) the links between
participation and economic policy dialogue; (2) the
ambiguities of ‘national ownership’ of PRSPs,
especially of pro-poor economic policies; (3) the
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‘small-government’ bias of neoliberalism; (4) the need
for pro-active, public-investment based fiscal policy;
(5) the roadblock of restrictive inflation targeting;
(6) the adverse impact of financial deregulation on
poor households; and (7) the adverse impact on the
poor of privatisation, particularly privatisation of
public services.
2 Enhanced participation and economic
alternatives
The donor community puts a great deal of emphasis
on the need for participatory processes in formulating
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers. Enhanced
participation is certainly essential to building more
effective strategies but it does not, by itself,
guarantee pro-poor outcomes. In many cases,
participation has been mostly a government-
sponsored one-off consultation with civil-society
organisations and community groups, designed to
elicit a rubber stamp for strategies already formulated.
In other words, participation has been more about
process than substantive content; it has seldom been
about exploring alternatives, especially economic
alternatives, and engaging in debate on policy
differences. Civil society representatives have often
had little substantive input into PRSPs and little
chance of influencing programme design. The call by
the international donor community for national
‘ownership’ of PRSPs usually implies that national
stakeholders are encouraged to agree with a pre-
determined set of external policy recommendations.
They have had little opportunity to choose among
various policy options, much less formulate their own.
At best, the scenario is one of ‘choice-less’
participation, with negligible scope for real policy
choice. The most severe problems are in the realm of
economic policymaking. In this area, there is still little
latitude for choice or debate. External
conditionalities remain tightly binding, despite the
recent muted rituals of critical self-examination,
generated by the research departments and
independent evaluation offices of international
financial institutions.
If PRSPs, and their economic content in particular,
were nationally determined, several conditions would
be necessary. First, the one-size-fits-all approach
should be jettisoned and strategies should be tailored
to country-specific contexts. Second, citizens should
be presented with real policy choices in poverty
reduction strategies. Third, there should be broad-
based national debate and dialogue before a strategy
is finally adopted.
A participatory process for determining pro-poor
economic policies must be based on examining a
range of credible alternatives. However, policymakers
and citizens are often led to believe that there is no
alternative to the conventional set of structural
adjustment policies. This is where progressive
economists should be focusing most of their
attention, providing feasible economic policy options,
based on alternative development paradigms. So far,
much of the economic critique of neoliberal policies
is based on Keynesian or post-Keynesian
perspectives. There is, in fact, little real diversity of
dissent and usually only moderate critiques of the
mainstream.
3 ‘National ownership’ vs. conditionality
The Bretton Woods Institutions and the donor
community at large often proclaim the need for
national ‘ownership’ of poverty reduction strategies,
including Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs).
What is needed, however, is national empowerment
over policy formulation, not merely national
‘ownership’. National ‘ownership’ of such strategies is
a donor obsession, not a government objective.
Governments are being urged to adopt ‘as their own’
policies introduced by outside agencies – without real
policy autonomy in designing ‘home-grown’ strategies.
There is, in fact, an inherent conflict between
national determination of policies and lender
conditionalities – hence the focus of lenders on
questions of ownership. The conditions imposed by
international financial institutions on national
policymaking have become increasingly
comprehensive. The conditionalities of the IMF have
extended, for example, well beyond its original
mandate of monetary, fiscal and exchange rate
policies. But as the range of conditionalities has
expanded, not surprisingly the rate of national
compliance has diminished (Buira 2003).
The Bretton Woods Institutions now place a great
deal of emphasis on supporting capacity
development for national ‘ownership’ of PRSPs and
their associated economic policies. But there is again
an inherent conflict of interest for the external
institutions that set the conditionalities for countries
to try to promote national policy autonomy.
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Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers have replaced
Structural Adjustment Programmes as the basis for
World Bank and IMF lending. Thus, they have to be
approved by their executive boards. In the process,
conditionalities have spread to cover all important
economic decisions and many structural policies,
social measures, governance reforms and, last but
not least, anti-poverty strategies themselves.
Yet the position of both the Bank and the Fund and
many international donors is that PRSPs should be
‘nationally owned’, ‘home-grown’ strategies.
Additionally, these institutions have agreed to ‘align
and harmonise’ their operations with the PRSPs
assuming, heroically, that they are ‘nationally owned’.
The Bretton Woods institutions have also lobbied to
have all other donors align their assistance with the
PRSP framework.
If PRSPs were genuinely ‘home-grown’, they should
exhibit a wide diversity of approaches. However,
dominated by international priorities, these strategies
are remarkably uniform (Stewart and Wang 2003).
This is most evident in their macroeconomic policies.
The IMF’s Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility,
which sets most macroeconomic policies for
borrowing countries, should be based on the PRSPs.
But the reverse has been the case.
Partly because most PRGFs have been negotiated
before PRSPs, they have bypassed any national
dialogue or debate, in which various policy options
could be evaluated. The PRGF macroeconomic
framework is imported virtually without change into
the PRSP. And national policy autonomy is sacrificed
in the process. Such an approach guarantees that, in
practice if not in theory, there is indeed no viable
alternative to neoliberalism.
4 Small government is the problem, not the
solution
A small government bias governs all neoliberal
economic reforms. Structural adjustment policies
have led to substantial downsizing of the state in
many developing countries – debilitating their
capacities to formulate and implement the pro-poor
policies that are now required for PRSPs. Tax
reforms have combined with recessions to depress
the revenue levels for many governments. Cutting
expenditures has been heartily endorsed, especially
for public administration, but raising taxes has been
only mildly supported.
As a consequence, many governments in developing
countries lack enough revenue to invest in growth
and fight poverty. A pervasive ‘small-government
ideology’ hides the reality that governments are
starved of resources, unable to adequately finance
many essential public services. Poor households end
up as the main losers. While directing more money
to pro-poor expenditures is part of the answer,
raising more funds is also critical – but frequently
neglected. The domestic revenue base of most
developing countries is too small, not too big.
The main problem is the lack of tax revenue. For all
developing countries, tax revenue as a ratio to GDP
is about half the level of industrial countries (i.e.
18 per cent vs. 38 per cent) (Tanzi and Zee 2001). In
poor countries, such as Bangladesh, Guatemala,
Guinea, Madagascar and Nepal, the total revenue is
only 10–11 per cent of the GDP, or less.
Moreover, in many countries, total revenue as a
percentage of GDP has fallen, weakening the
capacity of the state to promote development. In
Bangladesh, for example, the ratio of total revenue
to GDP dropped from about 12 per cent in 1990, an
already low level for a poor country, to only 10 per
cent in 2000. During the same period, the ratio for
Indonesia dropped from about 19 per cent to 16 per
cent and in Sri Lanka from 21 per cent to 17 per cent.
This downsizing of public budgets poses several
problems. The state is hampered in playing a
significant redistributive role through taxes and
expenditures. This is occurring at the same time that
the international donor community is compelling
countries to implement PRSPs, which must
necessarily have a redistributive impact to be
effective. Also, when the public budget is small,
governments are unable to use fiscal policy as a
counter-cyclical tool for stabilisation of the economy.
The weight of government expenditures in relation
to the whole economy is simply too small.
Standard tax reforms do not provide the answer to
boosting revenue. Trade liberalisation has significantly
reduced trade taxes – a big source of revenue for many
poor countries. In Indonesia, for instance, weighted
mean tariffs on all products are only about 5 per cent,
while in Sri Lanka they are only about 7 per cent.
The main replacement for trade taxes, the value-
added tax (VAT) on consumption of goods and
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services, is often regressive. Because the poor have
to use most of their income for basic consumption,
at least the food or other essential items that they
consume should be exempted. By contrast, the
income and wealth of the rich are under-taxed,
because of loopholes and/or poor enforcement of
tax laws. Tax concessions to the rich are estimated,
for example, to be equivalent to about 4 per cent of
GDP in Pakistan.
Having the rich pay their fair share of taxes would
thus be an important response to the problem. Tax
systems should be more equitable as well as more
efficient. The poor should not pay proportionately
more taxes than the rich, nor should they receive
proportionately fewer public benefits. A lot of
attention has been paid to re-allocating expenditures
to the poor. More needs to be done to reform tax
systems to make their impact more equitable. Tax
reformers could both broaden the tax base and make
tax incidence more equitable by closing such
loopholes while lowering rates on indirect taxes,
such as the VAT, which tend to be regressive (Pasha
2003).
Thus the big priority for tax reform is to change the
composition of taxes away from regressive
consumption taxes and towards progressive income
and wealth taxes. In industrial countries, the ratio of
income to consumption taxes is more than double
that of developing countries (Tanzi and Zee 2001).
More could certainly be done to tax wealth, which is
often neglected as a source of revenue. Urban
property taxes could be raised in most countries.
Simply registering urban property, doing accurate
valuation of property values and modestly raising
property tax rates could contribute significantly to
boosting revenue. Even mainstream economists now
recognise that there is greater scope for raising
revenue from property taxes (Williamson 2003).
5 The key role of public investment in growth
and poverty reduction
In most developing countries, more expansionary
fiscal policies are needed to accelerate economic
growth. Fiscal policies are also needed to play a
counter-cyclical role in stabilising the economy.
Moreover, the growth stimulated by fiscal expansion
can help generate the fiscal revenue needed to close
any deficits incurred in the process of expansion,
depending on the elasticity of taxes with respect to
GDP.
Such policy recommendations are based on the
assumption that the economies of most developing
countries are demand-constrained, not price-
constrained (Weeks and Roy 2004). An economy is
demand-constrained when its level of output is
limited by the components of aggregate demand,
namely, consumption, private investment,
government expenditures and net exports. In such an
economy, the set of relative prices derives from the
level of aggregate demand and changes in response
to the rise or fall of aggregate demand. Relative
prices are not ‘signals’ to producers and consumers
but result from production and consumption
decisions. When total aggregate demand is deficient,
active fiscal policies play a central role in moving the
economy towards full employment and generating a
higher growth rate.
Within this context, public investment plays a crucial
role in accelerating the rate of economic growth,
both by providing a demand stimulus to the
economy and expanding its productive capacity. Such
investment can also play an important role in
allocating resources to the poor – namely, it can give
the pattern of growth a more pro-poor character.
Thus, public investment is essential to a pro-poor and
pro-growth economic strategy for three major
reasons: demand management, capacity expansion
and redistribution (Weeks and Roy 2004).
Public investment is not the enemy of private
investment, as neoliberal economics claims, but its
prerequisite. It is essential for basic social and physical
infrastructure. When well-designed public
investment boosts the productivity of labour and
capital and enhances profit expectations, it stimulates
more private investment, instead of ‘crowding it out’
as is often mistakenly maintained. In Indonesia, for
example, regression analysis for the period 1972–97
demonstrated that every 1 percentage point increase
in public investment translated into an increase of a
0.66 percentage point in private investment.
Crowding-out is unlikely when an economy is not
near full employment (as is the case in almost all
developing countries) and the capital-output ratio for
public investment is no higher than for private
investment (Weeks and Roy 2004).
Instead of focusing on public investment, many
international donors have become champions of
‘private-sector development’ and boosting ‘investor
confidence’ to trigger more private investment.
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However, although growth of the private sector is
desirable, it is not equivalent to development.
Moreover, the private sector cannot grow without
public investment in basic economic and social
infrastructure that stimulates expansion of the
economy. Without growth, the private sector cannot
generate profits; and without profits, there will be
little motivation for private investment, domestic or
foreign.
Economists favouring neoliberal policies also argue
that increasing public investment will enlarge public
deficits and that these, in turn, will fuel higher
inflation, depreciation of the exchange rate and
higher real rates of interest. However, there is little
empirical evidence from economic literature that
public investment crowds out private investment
through changes in the interest rate or exchange
rate (Hemming et al. 2002). Moreover, the multiplier
impact of public investment can be powerful if there
is excess capacity in an economy and households are
liquidity constrained – as is the case in many
developing countries.
Many rich-country advisers often argue against
expansionary fiscal policies – except in their own
countries. In the USA, for example, between the
third-quarter of 2000 and the third-quarter of 2003,
there was an astonishing fiscal stimulus of US$638
billion, or 6 per cent of the 2003 GDP (Izurieta
2003). But this stimulus took the form of tax cuts
rather than increases in public expenditures and the
tax reductions mainly benefited the rich. On average,
however, the multiplier impact on an economy of a
tax cut is half as powerful as that of an increase in
expenditures (Hemming et al. 2002). If the rich get
the benefits, the impact is even weaker. This implies
that for pro-poor growth, make sure: (1) public
investment is increased and (2) it benefits the poor.
Despite the pressing need for more public
investment, it remains low where it should be high,
namely, in low-income countries with under-supplied
public goods. In many countries, it is also falling. In
South Asia, capital expenditures were only 9 per cent
of the total public expenditures in 2000, down from
12 per cent in 1990. As a percentage of GDP, public
investment should be over 5 per cent in most
developing countries. But in many countries, it is well
below this level. In Pakistan, for instance, public
investment is currently 2.5 per cent, in Zimbabwe 2.1
per cent, and in Georgia a mere 0.4 per cent.
Public investment is also critical to poverty reduction,
but not just for basic education and health – on
which everyone now agrees – but also for such
essential infrastructure as rural roads, energy and
irrigation. Increased growth cannot benefit the poor
without more rural and agricultural development.
This is precisely where public investment is most
needed, and most lacking.
6 Tight inflation targets as roadblock to growth
The multipliers for fiscal expansion remain large,
particularly when a moderate monetary expansion
accompanies an increase in public investment.
However, neoliberal policies are biased towards tight
monetary policies. The emergence of huge magnitudes
of mobile finance capital along with capital account
liberalisation have favoured the implementation of
deflationary policies as a way of preventing capital
outflows by both foreign and domestic investors
(Patnaik 2003). Such policies have contributed to
tightening demand constraints on developing country
economies, in the name of promoting macroeconomic
stability and investor confidence.
However, under such conditions, it is urgent to
advocate for income stability as well as price stability –
to emphasise employment targeting as well as
inflation targeting. Slow growth and low employment
hurt the poor more than anyone else. Inflation is not
their only problem. While moderate inflation can be
compatible with growth, both low and high inflation
can be harmful (Chowdhury 2003). When low-
inflation policies drive an economy into recession, the
poor lose out, often for years thereafter.
Monetary policy is too important to be left to central
bankers. Without jobs and income, people cannot
benefit from price stability. Inflation targets should
be determined, not independently by technocrats,
but by government-wide and democratic decision-
making. The monetary specialists can then be left to
craft the means.
Most developing countries have been advised to
reduce their annual inflation rate to a 3–5 per cent
range – a usual conditionality for obtaining access to
concessionary loans. And many national central banks
have been given the independence to achieve this
monetary goal – despite any adverse consequences
for growth, employment and poverty. Apparently,
some economic policies are too important to be
subject to democratic decision-making.
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Average inflation in the developing world has
declined to its lowest level, namely, about 4 per
cent, since the 1960s. Recently, the main problem
for over one-quarter of these countries, especially in
Asia, has not been inflation, but deflation (a
sustained fall in the general price level). During
2000–01, for example, the inflation rates in
Cambodia and Vietnam were –0.6 per cent and
–0.4 per cent, respectively. In Bangladesh and China,
the inflation rates were 1.1 per cent and 0.3 per cent,
respectively – rates that were perilously close to
deflation given the upward bias of the CPI measure.
A major factor contributing to the danger of
deflation has been unnecessarily restrictive monetary
policies. Another factor has been a slowing global
economy.
The danger created by deflation is that it can
precipitate a self-reinforcing downward spiral of
prices, profits and incomes, from which it is difficult
for policymakers to extricate an economy. Monetary
policies are usually ineffective when an economy has
slipped into such a ‘liquidity trap’. Thus, it is better to
prevent deflation than to try to combat it once it
sets in. For such a purpose, it is often necessary to
deploy counter-cyclical fiscal policies. Once deflation
is entrenched, expansionary fiscal policies are also
more reliable than monetary policies in reviving the
economy (IMF 2003).
There is no evidence that very low inflation is good
for growth. Many studies confirm that moderate
inflation – certainly above 5 per cent and at least up
to 15 per cent – can have a positive effect on growth
(Pollin and Zhu 2006). The standard justification for
minimising inflation is that it hurts the poor. But this
misreads the facts: very high, destabilising inflation
(such as above 40 per cent) definitely hurts the poor.
And very low inflation (below 5 per cent) can also
harm their interests by impeding growth and
employment.
When central banks try to squelch inflation, the
economy is often driven into a ‘stabilisation trap’
(Chowdhury 2003). Looming on the horizon is
deflation, the self-reinforcing downward spiral of
prices, profits, output and employment.
7 The dismal record of financial deregulation
One of the cornerstones of recent economic
reforms has been financial deregulation. But the
record of such deregulation has been neither pro-
poor nor pro-growth. It has often destabilised the
economies of developing countries and denied access
of poor households to credit. Under liberalisation,
real interest rates have risen and the spread between
the deposit and lending rates of interest has
widened. In 2001, the real rate of interest in
Bangladesh, for example, was 14 per cent and the
spread between deposit and lending rates of interest
was over 7 percentage points. In Cambodia, this
spread was over 12 percentage points in 2001.
Commercial banks have tended to concentrate their
activities in a few urban areas, depriving the rural
population of access to financial services. This has
made access to credit more inequitable than before
liberalisation. Banks have been reluctant to lend in
rural areas, especially if the rural economy is
stagnant. But even in China, which has maintained a
rural financial system, the Agricultural Bank of China
and the rural credit cooperatives have retrenched
their operations in rural areas, hampering the
prospects for rural growth and poverty reduction.
Under liberalisation, banks and corporations have
resorted more to short-term external borrowing,
making the country more vulnerable to short-term
capital flight – and wreaking havoc on the economy
in times of crisis. When the economy is booming,
‘hot money’ rushes in to make a quick profit, but this
sows the seeds of financial instability.
In the face of rising criticism of financial
deregulation, the IMF has recently conducted
research on the topic but it has failed to find a
positive relationship between financial liberalisation
and economic growth (Prasad et al. 2003). The
available evidence points, in fact, to an association
between capital account liberalisation and
heightened vulnerability to crises. Thus, the economic
mainstream has begun to move away from
unqualified support for free capital movements. As
Williamson has noted recently, ‘financial liberalisation
often occurred without the appropriate complement
of prudential supervision’ (Williamson 2003: 2).
The mainstream is still committed to liberalisation
but stresses the importance of a conducive
environment, such as ‘prudential supervision’ (as
Williamson argues) or sound domestic institutions (as
the IMF now emphasises for capital account
liberalisation). The result: developing countries are
still primarily to blame for their financial woes, not
IDS Bulletin Volume 39  Number 2  May 2008 99
the pro-cyclical nature of external capital flows or
the poor quality of external advice. Also, despite
recent expressions of misgivings, financial
liberalisation continues as a central ingredient of
standard structural adjustment programmes. In
practice, national policymakers have to contend with
only marginally reformed liberalisation.
Meanwhile, for poverty reduction purposes, the
international donor community continues to focus
myopically on microfinance when it should be
addressing the fundamental problems created by
unregulated financial liberalisation. Without state
support, for instance, a rural banking system is
seldom sustainable and equitable. Under a regime of
‘free capital movements’, farmers and non-farm
enterprises are customarily deprived of adequate
levels of credit, which are crucial to reduce poverty.
In addition, long-term investment is constrained as
commercial banks increasingly focus on short-term
lending, such as for consumer durables or working
capital. This is a major problem, for instance, in
Indonesia, where banks maintain high real lending
rates of interest – despite a reduction in policy rates
of interest – because they are reluctant to commit
credit to long-term private investment. In such a
situation, the inflow of speculative capital only
exacerbates the short-term horizon of investors.
Indonesia is now attracting short-term portfolio
investment, not foreign direct investment, but such
‘hot money’ only magnifies the country’s vulnerability
to a new crisis.
Without stronger regulation and effective supervision,
financial institutions will promote neither sustainable
nor equitable growth. But direct state support to the
provision of development finance is also needed
(Chandrasekhar 2004). Private financial institutions
provide relatively little long-term investment finance.
The lack of such finance has been a problem in Sri
Lanka, for example, since the privatisation of the state-
run Development Finance Corporation of Ceylon and
the National Development Bank. In contrast, Vietnam
has continued to support a heavily financed
Development Assistance Fund for directing credit to
priority industries.
In summary, unfettered financial deregulation hurts
growth and harms the poor. Contrary to the
liberalisation mania, the international development
community should advocate for more regulation of
the financial sector, including foreign short-term
borrowing, because more equitable access to
financial services will help foster financial stability and
economic growth. Donor assistance should expand
beyond microfinance to encourage public sector
support to development finance, and, in particular, to
rural banking systems and financial institutions
serving small and medium enterprises. If SMEs in
urban centres and rural areas cannot obtain access to
credit, widespread employment at decent wages – a
prerequisite for sustainable poverty reduction – will
not be created.
8 Questioning the contribution of privatisation
Privatisation of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and
other publicly owned assets, such as land and
housing, has been an integral component of
neoliberal economic reforms. The justification has
been that public ownership of assets is inefficient
because it distorts incentives, hampers resource
allocation and impedes innovation. In addition, it is
alleged that state-owned enterprises are a drain on
public resources and a source of rent-seeking and
corruption.
However, the evidence on the impact of privatisation
on efficiency has been generally unconvincing
(Dagdeviren and Fine 2004). In some cases,
efficiencies can be improved without changing
ownership of assets. Privatisation appears to be less
important, in most cases, than competition and
regulation. Once the latter two factors are taken
into account, the contribution of privatisation to
efficiency is often statistically insignificant.
Also, the long-term impact of privatisation on
government budgets remains unclear – especially
when profitable SOEs, which are the most attractive
to private buyers, are sold at fire-sale prices. When
sale prices are low and the administrative costs of
privatisation are taken into account, the net proceeds
from selling SOEs might well be negative. In
addition, over the long term, the taxes paid by
privatised firms, which are likely to be low, might not
compensate for the loss of the profits of the SOEs.
Also, the balance sheet would be even more
negative if the costs of regulation of the privatised
firm were taken into account.
Little research has been done, until recently, on the
distributional impact of privatisation, particularly on
the poor. Privatisation of the provision of public
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services, such as water, energy and social services,
has often led to less coverage and higher prices for
poor households (Kessler 2003).
In transition economies, the drive to privatise land, in
the name of boosting efficiencies, has threatened to
magnify poverty by intensifying inequality in the
distribution of land and increasing landlessness. This
has been a problem, for example, in Cambodia,
which privatised land in 1989 (Dagdeviren and Fine
2004). In Mongolia, privatisation of the ownership of
livestock has also led to greater inequality (Nixson
and Walters 2003). In countries, such as China and
Vietnam, where use-rights to the land are
distributed relatively equitably, using privatisation to
redistribute land to private farmers is a reform of
questionable value, because it is fraught with the
danger of dramatically augmenting rural poverty.
When public wealth is converted into private wealth,
the distribution of wealth usually becomes more
unequal. Even when equity-enhancing methods, such
as ‘voucher’ privatisation in Mongolia, have been
used, an initially egalitarian distribution of privatised
assets has quickly become more unequal as a few
oligarchs buy up the certificates of ownership. In
many cases, privatisation of SOEs has done nothing
to reduce rent-seeking and corruption. By boosting
the economic power of oligarchs, privatisation has
contributed, if anything, to more corruption.
9 Conclusion: a tripartite policy framework for
pro-poor growth
If polices are to promote pro-poor growth, we may
need to think in terms of a tripartite analytical
framework that integrates three major sets of
policies: macroeconomic policies, structural policies
(which impact the structure of production and the
nature of economic institutions) and equity-enhancing
policies. If macroeconomic policies are to stimulate
investment and growth, they may need to break with
neoliberal prescriptions and take macroeconomic
stability as a constraint rather than an objective. Fiscal
policies will have to become more expansionary in
nature, more focused on public investment to expand
economic opportunities as well as stimulate
aggregate demand. They will have to become more
reliant on the mobilisation of domestic revenue
(instead of official development assistance) to finance
such public investment. This stance implies a strong
focus on the supply side, e.g. on expanding productive
capacity and mobilising domestic resources.
It would also imply a managed instead of a laissez-
faire exchange-rate regime, a focus on containing
external shocks (such as terms-of-trade or capital
outflow shocks) and a focus on maintaining a
competitive exchange rate (which, if possible, should
be slightly under-valued). And finally, it would imply
monetary policies designed to support fiscal
expansion and export promotion, provide adequate
liquidity to a growing economy and foster low but
positive real rates of interest for private (and public)
investment. Strict inflation targeting (especially a
monetary stance that seeks to achieve a low inflation
target, such as under 5 per cent) would be
inconsistent with such an approach.
Structural policies should then be used to influence
the pattern of growth so as to structure access to
economic opportunities and employment, and thus
have a potentially strong distributional impact. Thus,
the impact of fiscal policies can be differentiated by
economic sector or employment category (e.g. the
location of public investment in infrastructure).
Access to financial services can be differentiated,
such as increasing access to credit in rural areas.
Industrial policies can be used to channel resources
differentially to various economic sectors or
subsectors (e.g. to tradables rather than to non-
tradables). Trade policies can be adjusted by sector or
subsector. For purposes of fostering food security, for
example, tariffs could be used to protect agriculture
in a poor country. The public-sector provision of
services can also be calibrated to have differential
impacts across the population.
However, even if such policies were successful in
stimulating both faster growth and broader
employment generation, there would still be no
guarantee that poor workers could benefit from
such trends. Hence, there is a compelling need for a
third set of ‘equity-enhancing’ or ‘poverty focused’
policies. These often involve enhancing the access of
the working population to education, skill
development, technology, land, other productive
assets (such as tools and equipment) and public
infrastructure. Many households are poor precisely
because their working members lack such access.
Correcting such inequities can often involve re-
shaping or re-focusing the impact of structural
policies. An example would be providing the financial
system with greater incentives to offer services, such
as microfinance to micro-entrepreneurs. Or equity-
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enhancing policies could involve the focusing of
resources on certain social groupings. This could take
the form, for instance, of providing employment
guarantee programmes for such unemployed or
underemployed workers.
Spreading the benefits of growth through structural
policies can make growth more ‘inclusive’ – in the
sense of not leaving the poor ‘behind’. In contrast,
equity-enhancing policies can help make growth
more ‘pro-poor’, i.e. benefiting poor workers and
households more than proportionately. However,
such a ‘pro-poor’ impact can be achieved only
through an explicit and focused allocation of
resources on poor households and individuals.
To be successful, equity-enhancing policies also need
to be more ‘bottom-up’ in their approach, mobilising
among communities, for example, in order to press
for more or better public services or to help link
poor workers with available employment
opportunities. In contrast, structural policies are
more ‘top-down’ in their approach while
macroeconomic policies just stay ‘at the top’, dealing
with economy-wide aggregates.
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Notes
* The positions expressed in this article are the
author’s and do not necessarily reflect those of
UNDP.
1 This article uses ‘neoliberal’ and ‘neoliberalism’
primarily as descriptive terms to denote the
dominant paradigm dictating macroeconomic and
adjustment conditionalities enforced by the
Bretton Woods Institutions since the 1980s.
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